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The Pitfalls in the Law of Attempt:
A New Perspective
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract The law of attempt is laden with some of the most hotly debated
and controversial issues in the criminal law sphere. This article provides a
critical and in-depth analysis of most, if not all, of the pitfalls that have
bedevilled this area of the law since time immemorial. In particular, the
discussion will focus on the type of mens rea required for an attempt, how
far an accused must progress toward the commission of the subject offence
in order to satisfy the actus reus component of an attempt, whether certain
offences are intrinsically incapable of being the subject of an attempt, and
whether the various courts and legislatures have agreed upon a univer-
sally accepted, coherent, and workable doctrine concerning the status of
'factual impossibility' as a defence to an attempt.
1. Introduction
Among the multitude of criminal offences recognised at common law,
perhaps none has engendered more uncertainty and controversy over
the years than the law of attempt. This is exemplified in the fact that
many of these problems remain substantially unabated, notwithstand-
ing the continual efforts of the judiciary to formulate viable solutions
through the incremental development of the common law. Although far
from exhaustive of these controversial areas, the most poignant include:
the type of mens rea that must be proved, how far the accused must have
progressed towards the completion of the intended offence in order to
satisfy the actus reus component; whether there are certain categories of
offences which, as a matter of law, cannot serve as a predicate for an
attempt; whether the doctrine of factual impossibility should be avail-
able as a defence to the crime of attempt; and whether one who has
committed an attempt should be absolved of liability if he or she volun-
tarily abandons the criminal enterprise before it has reached fruition.
The discussion to follow will focus on these and other issues in the
law of attempt, particularly those that have proven to be the most
intractable. In addition, the discussion will explore and critically analyse
the litany of unsatisfactory efforts by both the courts and legislatures to
redress these problems. It is important to emphasise that although the
piece does not profess to offer viable solutions to many of these prob-
lems, it does endeavour to analyse them from a somewhat different
perspective that is designed not only to facilitate a better understanding
of these thorny issues, but ultimately lead to reforms that are workable,
sound in principle, and long overdue.
* Associate Professor, Deakin University; e-mail: moe@deakin.edu.au. I would like to
thank my research assistant, Matthew Cookson, for making an invaluable
contribution to this piece.
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2. Overview
There are two major areas of controversy surrounding the law of at-
tempts. The first concerns the mens rea component of the offence;
specifically, whether the mens rea needed to convict for an attempt is
satisfied by proving that the accused acted with the same mens rea
needed to convict for the subject (complete) offence. The second con-
cerns the actus reus component of attempts insofar as it relates to what is
often termed the ‘proximity rule’. Under this rule, the actus reus of
attempt requires the accused to have taken steps that are immediately
and not merely remotely connected with the commission of the subject
offence. Although the legislatures and courts have formulated a logical
and satisfactory answer to the mens rea controversy, they have thus far
failed to formulate any clear guidelines for determining how far the
accused must have progressed towards the commission of the subject
offence in order to satisfy the ‘proximity rule’.
3. The mens rea for attempt at common law
The seminal English case of R v Mohan1 is the classic authority regarding
the mens rea requirement of attempt. In Mohan, the accused was con-
victed of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm by wanton (reckless)
driving. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge
had misdirected the jury when he stated that this crime was established
if the jury was satisfied that the accused acted with the same recklessness
required by the complete offence.2
The Court of Appeal held that intent was ‘an essential element of the
offence of attempt’,3 and went on to examine the meaning of intention.
Intention was defined as a decision to bring about a certain conse-
quence,4 and was distinguished from the motive or emotion leading to
the action.5 The court opined that the direction of the trial judge could
only be upheld if intention was broadly construed to include reckless-
ness, meaning knowledge of the likely consequences of one’s actions.6
Finding no authority to justify this position,7 the court concluded that
while knowledge of the likely consequences of one's conduct does
constitute evidence of intention, it does not amount to intention in
itself.8 The court commented that the crime of attempt is a serious
offence that is often as morally culpable as the full crime,9 but as it is one
step removed from the commission of the intended offence, the courts
must not ‘strain to bring within the offence of attempt conduct which
1 [1976] QB 1.
2 Ibid. at 2.




7 Ibid. at 10.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. at 11.
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does not fall within the well-established bounds of the offence’.10 Ac-
cordingly, the final direction of the trial judge was found to be bad in law
and the appeal was allowed.11
(a) Can recklessness constitute a sufficient mens rea for an attempt at
common law?
Although Mohan appeared to unequivocally reject the notion that any
mens rea short of an intention to bring about all the consequences of the
subject offence could suffice for an attempt, subsequent Australian
decisions raised doubts as to the continued vitality of this rule. One such
case was R v Evans.12
In Evans, an appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia con-
cerned a trial judge’s direction regarding the crime of attempted rape.13
The trial judge directed that the mental element of attempted rape was
identical to that of the completed crime of rape; namely, that the accused
must have acted with knowledge that the alleged victim was not, or
might not (recklessness) be consenting to the sexual penetration.14 It
was argued that given the purposive nature of attempts, every element
of the crime must be intended, even if the complete crime could be
committed with a less culpable form of mens rea than intent (in this case
recklessness).15
In answering this question, the court could find no analogous author-
ity to guide it.16 A similar question had been posed in the case of R v
Zorad,17 which also concerned a charge of attempted rape. In Zorad, the
trial judge directed the jury that the mens rea for attempted rape included
‘a determination to have intercourse whether the prospective victim
was consenting or not’.18 It was argued that this amounted to reckless-
ness and, in accordance with Mohan, was not comprehended within the
mens rea of attempts.19 The trial judge, however, had clarified his state-
ment by going on to state that the accused ‘must have had the intent to
penetrate the prosecutrix without her consent’.20 According to Street CJ,
this qualification corrected any error that might have occurred in the
direction21 and made it unnecessary for the court to decide whether the
direction would have been incorrect had it included recklessness. The
court in Evans also distinguished the current case from those of
Whybrow22 and Mohan23 by drawing a distinction between the accused’s
state of mind as to the prohibited consequences of his or her conduct,
10 [1976] QB 1.
11 Ibid.
12 [1987] 30 A Crim R 262.
13 Ibid. at 263.
14 Ibid. at 266.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 [1979] 2 NSWLR 764.




22 (1951) 35 Cr App R 141.
23 [1976] QB 1.
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and the accused’s state of mind as to the existence of facts which render
his or her conduct criminal.24 Both of those cases concerned the mens rea
of intention with regard to bringing about one or more consequences
required by the definition of the intended crime, but neither concerned
the accused's state of mind vis-a`-vis the existence of facts rendering the
conduct in question illegal.25
The court stated that in order to satisfy the mens rea for attempt, the
accused must intend to bring about all the consequences required by the
definition of the subject offence, but the court could find no reason why
this principle should extend to the existence of facts rendering an act
criminal.26 In relation to the existence of facts which render conduct
criminal, the court further reasoned that it will suffice for the accused to
have acted with the same mens rea required by the definition of the
complete crime, even if this does not go as far as intention. The court
further reasoned that because lack of consent was not a consequence of
the actions of a would be rapist, but a fact that would render such actions
criminal should it be present, the requisite mens rea was identical to that
of the complete crime and a direction of recklessness was appropriate.27
The appeal was dismissed.
According to Evans, therefore, there are certain offences for which the
same mens rea that will suffice to convict for the subject offence will also
suffice for an attempt to commit the offence.28 It is noteworthy that
three years prior to Evans, a three-member majority of the High Court
stated in Alister v The Queen,29 per obiter dicta, that the mens rea for
attempted murder was satisfied by proof that the accused acted with
recklessness in regard to occasioning grievous bodily harm on the vic-
tim.30 As murder is the ultimate crime in which the requisite mens rea
relates to the consequences of the accused’s conduct, the rather tenuous
distinction drawn by the Full Supreme Court of South Australia in Evans
is clearly at odds with the obiter dicta in Alister. In any event, the High
Court ultimately departed from these obiter dicta and held that nothing
short of an intention that the subject offence be committed can suffice
for an attempt at common law.31 Stated differently, there must be an
intention to bring about all the consequences (external elements) of the
subject offence. As the common law rule enunciated in Evans cannot be
reconciled with the High Court’s decision in Knight, it too must be seen
as overruled.
The ease with which the rule enunciated in Knight is stated belies the
complexities that inhere in its practical application. In particular, the
24 [1987] 30 A Crim R 262 at 267.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. at 268.
27 Ibid.
28 See also R v Khan [1990] 2 All ER 783 (holding that recklessness in regard to the
victim’s lack of consent is a sufficient mens rea for the offence of attempted rape).
29 (1984) 154 CLR 404.
30 Ibid. at 421–2 (per Gibbs CJ dissenting); at 431 (per Murphy J dissenting); at 446
(per Wilson and Dawson JJ); at 467 (per Brennan J).
31 Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 501. For an example of a recent decision
following Knight, see R v MJJ [2004] NSWSC 57.
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complexity centres on exactly what is meant by the requirement that
the accused must have intended that the subject offence would be
committed? The answer will depend on whether the subject offence is
properly classified as one of ‘basic’ or ‘general’ intent, ‘specific’ intent, or
‘strict liability’.
With regard to ‘basic’ or ‘general’ (hereafter referred to as ‘basic’) and
‘specific’ intent crimes, courts and legal scholars have yet to articulate a
universally agreed upon explanation of the distinction between the two
categories. This elusive distinction is perhaps best explained in a passage
from Lord Simon’s judgment in DPP v Morgan:32
By ‘crimes of basic intent’ [crimes of general intent] I mean those crimes
whose definition expresses (or, more often, implies) a mens rea which does
not go beyond the actus reus. The actus reus generally consists of an act and
some consequence. The consequence may be very closely connected with
the act or more remotely connected with it; but with a crime of basic intent
the mens rea does not extend beyond the act and its consequence, however
remote, as defined in the actus reus. I take assault as an example of a crime
of basic intent where the consequence is very closely connected with the
act. The actus reus of assault is an act which causes another person to
apprehend immediate and unlawful violence. The mens rea corresponds
exactly . . . On the other hand there are crimes of ulterior intent [crimes of
specific intent]—‘ulterior’ because the mens rea goes beyond contemplation
of the actus reus. For example, in the crime of wounding with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm, the actus reus is the wounding. The prosecution
must prove a corresponding mens rea (as with unlawful wounding), but the
prosecution must go further: it must show that the accused foresaw that
serious physical injury would probably be a consequence of his act, or
would possibly be so, that being a purpose of his act.
Thus, crimes of ‘basic’ intent are those in which the mens rea(s) of the
offence does not extend beyond one or more of the non-mens rea (actus
reus) elements of the offence as defined by its statutory or common law
definition.
Although the matter is far from settled, Lord Simon’s passage sup-
ports the proposition that murder is a crime of ‘basic’ intent. Depending
on the jurisdiction involved, an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm or even recklessness as to causing death or grievous bodily harm
can constitute a sufficient mens rea for murder.33 The non-mens rea
elements of murder (or any form of homicide) are: (1) causing; (2) the
death; (3) of another human being.34 It is apparent that none of the
aforementioned mens reas contemplate something more than causing
the death of another human being. Intention to kill or recklessness as to
causing death contemplate and relate exactly to the three non-mens rea
32 [1976] AC 182 at 216–17.
33 In the ACT, NSW and Tasmania, the mens rea for murder will be satisfied if the
accused was reckless as to killing (grievous bodily harm will not suffice), Crimes
Act 1900 (ACT) s. 12(1)(b); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s. 18(1)(a); Criminal Code
(Tas) s. 157 (1)(c). Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory
require an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, recklessness will not
suffice: Criminal Code (NT) s. 162(1)(a); Criminal Code (Qld) s. 302(1); Criminal
Code (WA) s. 279(1).
34 P. Gillies, Criminal Law, 4th edn (Law Book Co: 1997) at 613–26.
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elements of the crime. The other possible mens reas, intention to cause
grievous bodily harm or recklessness as to causing the same, actually
contemplate something less than the three non-mens rea elements of
murder. It therefore follows that murder is a crime of ‘basic’ intent.
On the other hand, if one or more of the mens rea(s) of an offence go
beyond and contemplate something more than one or more of the non-
mens rea elements, the offence will be deemed as one of ‘specific’ intent.
For example, s. 20 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:
A person who, without lawful excuse, makes to another person a threat to
kill that other person or any other person—
(a) intending that that other person would fear the threat would be
carried out; or
(b) being reckless as to whether or not that other person would fear the
threat would be carried out—is guilty of an indictable offence . . .
The non-mens rea element of s. 20 is a threat to kill another person. The
mens rea for the offence requires that the accused must have either
intended or acted with recklessness in regard to placing the other person
in fear that the threat would be carried out. Thus, each of the alternative
mens reas extends beyond and contemplates something more than one
or more of the non-mens rea elements.
If the subject offence is one of ‘basic’ intent, it is sufficient to prove
that the accused intended that each and every one of the non-mens rea
elements of the subject offence would exist at the time the offence was
to take place.35 As rape is an example of a ‘basic’ intent crime, the mens
rea for attempted rape is satisfied by proof that the accused intended for
there to be carnal knowledge or sexual penetration of the victim without
his or her consent at the time the offence was to occur. Common assault
(‘battery’ type) is an additional example of a ‘basic’ intent crime. An
attempted ‘battery’ type common assault requires proof, therefore, that
the accused intended for there to be an unlawful application of force
against the victim without his or her consent at the time the offence was
to take place.
If the subject offence is one of specific intent, the prosecution must
prove, in addition to the mens rea required for basic or general intent
offences, that the accused acted with whatever specific intent is required
by the definition of the subject offence. Burglary at common law repre-
sents an example of a specific intent crime. At common law the elements
of burglary are: (1) breaking; (2) entering; (3) of the dwelling of an-
other; (4) at night-time; (5) with the intent to commit a felony therein.
What makes this a ‘specific’ intent crime is that the mens rea element ((5)
above) goes beyond and contemplates something more than one or
more of the non-mens rea elements ((1) through (4) above). In other
words, it contemplates something more than merely breaking and en-
tering the dwelling of another at night-time; namely, an intention to
commit a felony therein.
To satisfy the mens rea for attempted burglary, therefore, the prosecu-
tion must prove that the accused intended to bring about elements (1)
35 Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 501; R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 at 8.
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through (4) and did so with the mens rea set out in element (5)—all at the
time the subject offence was to take place. Similarly, in order to satisfy
the mens rea for an attempt to commit s. 20 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic),
the prosecution must prove that the accused intended to make to
another person a threat to kill that person or any other person and either
intended that the person to whom the threat was made would fear that
the threat would be carried out, or was reckless as to whether the person
to whom the threat was made would fear that the threat would be
carried out—at the time the subject offence was to occur.36
(b) Are there offences that cannot be attempted?
What if the offence is one of ‘strict’ or ‘absolute’ liability which, by
definition, does not require the prosecution to prove any type of mens
rea or negligence on the part of the accused?37 As offences of this genre
cannot be characterised as ones of basic or specific intent, the foregoing
methodology for ascertaining the mens rea requirement for an attempt is
both incongruous and unworkable.
This raises the question of whether it is possible to incur liability for an
attempt to commit an offence of this type. Although there is a paucity of
reported cases on this subject, there is no reason in logic or principle that
would preclude liability. Under the decisions of the English Court of
Appeal and High Court in Mohan and Knight respectively, an accused
does not satisfy the mens rea for an attempt unless he or she intends for
the subject offence to be committed.38 The issue, therefore, is whether
such an intention can be reconciled with the nature of a strict or
absolute liability offence. In addressing this issue, it is important to
understand that the essence of an offence of strict or absolute liability is
that the prosecution is not required to prove ‘fault’ on the part of the
accused.39 It is equally important to understand that there is nothing in
the nature of such an offence that precludes the imposition of liability on
one who has acted with intention, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or
negligence in relation to the proscribed consequences or the existence of
facts that render the conduct criminal. It therefore follows that there is
no inherent conflict between the mens rea for an attempt and the nature
of an offence of strict or absolute liability. It also follows, based upon the
principle enunciated in Mohan and Knight, that the mens rea for an
attempt to commit an offence of this type is satisfied by proof that the
accused intended to bring about the actus reus elements of the subject
offence.
Another difficult issue is whether an accused can be convicted of an
attempt to commit an offence that requires one or more of the actus reus
elements to have been brought about solely by way of recklessness or
negligence on the part of the accused. For example, ss 17 and 24 of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provide:
36 For recent English authority which appears consonant with this analysis, see
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1992) [1994] 2 All ER 121.
37 Gillies, above n. 34 at 81.
38 Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 501; R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 at 8.
39 Gillies, above n. 34 at 82.
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17. A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly causes serious injury
to another person is guilty of an indictable offence . . .
24. A person who by negligently doing or omitting to do an act causes
serious injury to another person is guilty of an indictable offence . . .
Is it not the very essence of ss 17 and 24 that the accused must cause
serious injury to another person solely by way of recklessness (s. 17) or
negligence (s. 24)?
Putting aside the controversial notion of constructive intention, is it
not a maxim that intention and all forms of negligence are mutually
exclusive of one another?40 If so, the requisite mens rea for an attempt
cannot be reconciled with offences such as ss 17 and 24. Although this
particular issue was not raised before the English Court of Appeal in
Mohan, the subject offence at issue was one that required the actus reus
elements (bodily harm) to have been brought about solely by wanton
(reckless) driving on the part of the accused. Since the conviction was
quashed on other grounds, the decision is not necessarily inconsistent
with the view that one cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an
offence of this type.
On the other hand, if an offence is defined in a way that permits one
or more of the actus reus elements to be brought about other than by way
of recklessness or negligence on the part of an accused, in principle there
is no apparent conflict that precludes liability for an attempt. Simply
stated, the very essence of such an offence is not that one or more of the
actus reus elements can only be brought about by an accused’s reckless-
ness or negligence. The common law offences of rape and ‘battery’ type
common assault serve well to illustrate this point. Both crimes consist of
an alternative mens rea requirement that an accused act intentionally or
recklessly in relation to one or more of the actus reus elements. In the
case of rape, an accused must act with either intention or recklessness in
regard to the woman’s lack of consent. In the case of ‘battery’ type
common assault, an accused must act with either intention or reckless-
ness in regard to making physical contact with another person. Thus, it
is possible to attempt either of these crimes.
Finally, both categories of manslaughter at common law raise trou-
blesome issues insofar as the law of attempts is concerned. With regard
to involuntary manslaughter, by definition the accused does not intend
to kill.41 It is apparent, therefore, that there can be no attempt to commit
involuntary manslaughter because the requisite mens rea for an attempt
requires nothing less than intent to bring about all of the actus reus
elements of the subject crime which, in this case, would include the
death of another human being.42 Thus, as in the examples of ss 17 and
24 above, the requisite mens rea for attempt and the very essence of the
subject offence are such that they cannot be reconciled. If the accused
40 W. P. Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton and D. G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Torts, 5th edn (West Group: 1984) 169.
41 Gillies, above n. 34 at 647; Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 at 581.
42 R v Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72.
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intended to kill, the appropriate charge would be attempted murder,
assuming the absence of some lawful justification or excuse.
If the intention to kill was induced by sufficient provocation on the
part of V to reduce the conviction to voluntary manslaughter if V had
died, there is a split of authority as to whether it is proper to charge the
accused with attempted voluntary manslaughter43 or, if the charge is
attempted murder, to direct the jury that it can convict on the lesser
charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
In commenting on this split of authority, it is apparent that considera-
tions of stare decisis alone are not an adequate justification for refusing to
allow provocation to be raised as a defence to attempted murder. This is
exemplified in the fact that the Code jurisdictions of Queensland, West-
ern Australia, and the Northern Territory have eschewed common law
precedent and extended the defence of provocation to crimes other than
murder.44 On the opposite side, it may be argued that if an accused
attempts to kill under circumstances that would allow the defence of
provocation to defeat a charge of murder had the attempt been success-
ful, the doctrine of legal impossibility would preclude a conviction for
attempted murder. The argument follows that in order to prevent the
accused from escaping criminal liability altogether, the better course is to
recognise the offence of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The fatal
flaw in this argument is that the doctrine of legal impossibility applies
only in instances where the accused’s intended objective, even if fully
implemented, would not have amounted to criminal misconduct. In the
scenario postulated, the accused’s intended objective would have
amounted to criminal misconduct, albeit not the crime of murder. Thus,
reliance on the doctrine of legal impossibility is misplaced. In the final
analysis, if the reasonable concession to human frailty rationale is an
adequate justification for permitting the defence of provocation to re-
duce what would otherwise be murder to the lesser offence of voluntary
manslaughter, there is no reason the defence should not apply as well to
reduce attempted murder to the lesser offence of attempted voluntary
manslaughter.
(c) The mens rea for attempt under the various statutory provisions
throughout Australia
Most, if not all, of the states and territories have now codified the
Australian common law position. In the Code jurisdictions of Western
43 For authority against recognition of attempted (voluntary) manslaughter, see R v
Cunningham [1959] 1 QB 288 at 290; R v Wells (1981) 28 SASR 63 (per Jacobs J);
R v Farrar [1992] 1 VR 207 at 210; Roche (1987) 29 A Crim R 168 at 169, 174
(construing the Criminal Code of Western Australia); McGhee v R (1995) 130 ALR
142 (holding that provocation could not be raised as a defence to a charge of
attempted murder under the Criminal Code of Tasmania). For authority in favour
of recognition, see Duvivier v R (1982) 5 A Crim R 89 at 93ff (per Mitchell J); at
106ff (per Zelling J); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s. 270AB. See J.
Sachs, ‘Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter a Possible Crime?’ [1982]
Illinois Bar Journal 166.
44 Criminal Code (Qld) ss 268, 269; Criminal Code (WA) ss 245, 246; Criminal Code
(NT) s. 34(1).
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Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory, the relevant statutory
provisions expressly require that the accused must intend to commit the
subject offence.45
In Queensland, the statutory crime of attempt provides that ‘[a]ny
person who attempts to commit any indictable offence is guilty of an
indictable offence . . .’.46 The wording of the statutory attempt provi-
sions in the common law jurisdictions of the ACT, New South Wales, and
South Australia is virtually identical to that of Queensland, the only
difference being that one can only be convicted of an attempt to commit
an indictable offence in Queensland.47 In the event of statutory ambi-
guity in the common law jurisdictions, there is a presumption that
common law principles apply in the absence of a clear legislative inten-
tion to the contrary.48 Although there is no such presumption in the
event of statutory ambiguity in a Code jurisdiction such as Queens-
land,49 the common law is highly persuasive. In Victoria, s. 321N(2)
provides:
For a person to be guilty of attempting to commit an offence, the person
must—
(a) intend that the offence the subject of the attempt be committed;
and
(b) intend or believe that any fact or circumstance the existence of
which is an element of the offence will exist at the time the offence is to
take place
Subsection (a) appears to adopt the common law position. But if that
is so, what is the effect of subs. (b)? Does it add to or in any way qualify
the common law position? In the view of this author, the answer must
be that it does not. The court in Evans held that a mens rea can relate to
either the prohibited consequence or consequences of one’s volitional
act(s) or omission(s) as defined by the common law or statutory defini-
tion of an offence—or it can relate instead to the existence of facts
which, according to the common law or statutory definition of an
offence, render one’s conduct criminal.50 Where the requisite mens rea is
one of intention, it typically falls within the former category. Where the
mens rea of recklessness is concerned, it can just as easily fall within
either category. The mens reas of knowledge and belief, on the other
hand, typically fall within the latter category. And while there are
certainly differences among the mens reas of intention, knowledge, and
belief,51 there is very little difference between intention and knowledge
45 Criminal Code (WA) s. 4; Criminal Code (Tas) s 2(1); Criminal Code (NT) s. 4(1).
46 Criminal Code (Qld) s. 535.
47 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 347; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 344A; Criminal Law
Consolidated Act 1935 (SA) s. 270A.
48 Gillies, above n. 34 at 8.
49 Ibid. at 9–10.
50 [1987] 30 A Crim R 262 at 267.
51 For insightful discussion of these mens rea generally, see Gillies, above n. 34 at
46–79.
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or belief, aside from the fact that intention typically relates to conse-
quences and knowledge or belief typically relate to the existence of facts
that render the conduct criminal. There is very little difference between
knowledge and belief; that is, belief is a state of mind that is one step
removed from knowledge in that it allows for some doubt, albeit minor,
as to the existence of the facts which render the conduct criminal.
When an offence is defined in such a way as to require that an
accused act (or omit to act) with knowledge or belief as to the existence
of certain facts, does it represent a departure from the common law to
require that same knowledge or belief vis-à-vis the existence of those
facts in order to satisfy the mens rea component of an attempt to commit
the offence? For example, the statutory crime of rape under subs.
38(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides that ‘[a] person commits
rape if . . . he or she intentionally sexually penetrates another person
without that person’s consent while being aware that the person is not
consenting or might not be consenting’. Consonant with the above
analysis, the mens rea of intention relates to the consequence of sexually
penetrating another person—while the alternative mens reas of aware-
ness (knowledge) or recklessness relate to the existence of the fact that
renders the conduct criminal: the absence of consent on the part of the
victim. As rape under s. 38(2)(a) is a crime of basic intent, at common
law the mens rea for an attempted rape under this provision would
require that an accused intend to penetrate another person sexually
without their consent at whatever time the offence is to occur. That an
accused must intend for these circumstances to exist serves to under-
score the reality that any person intending to commit a crime can never
be absolutely certain that his or her criminal scheme will reach fruition.
The wording of subs. (b) of s. 321N(2) reflects this reality by requiring
that an accused ‘intend or believe that any fact or circumstance the
existence of which is an element of the offence will exist at the time the
offence is to take place’ (emphasis added). In the context of subs. (b),
therefore, there is little or no difference between the words ‘intend’ and
‘believe’. Moreover, subs. (b) is consonant with the notion that inten-
tion and belief typically relate to proscribed consequences and the existence of
facts rendering the conduct criminal respectively. In substance, therefore,
subss (a) and (b) are merely a codification of the current Australian
common law position.
4. The actus reus for attempt at common law
As noted in the ‘Overview’ above, a major area of controversy surround-
ing the crime of attempt concerns the precise nature of its actus reus
component. Under what is often termed the ‘proximity rule’, the actus
reus of an attempt requires that the conduct of the accused must have
progressed to the point where it is immediately and not merely prepara-
tory to or remotely connected with the commission of the subject
offence. As the cases that follow illustrate, the courts and legislatures
have thus far failed in their efforts to formulate a satisfactory test for
resolving this issue.
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(a) The ‘last act’ test
The proximity rule was first and most famously enunciated in the case of
R v Eagleton.52 In Eagleton the accused contracted with the government to
supply bread to indigent persons, and would be paid based upon the
number of loaves supplied. The accused then defrauded the government
by selling underweight loaves, and money was credited to his account.
Before the money could be withdrawn, the government charged him
with attempting to obtain money under false pretences. Parke B enun-
ciated a test for the actus reus of attempt when he opined that ‘[a]cts
remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be
considered as attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected
with it are’.53 Parke B further opined that the test is satisfied (as in this
case) when the accused has performed the last act dependent upon
himself leading to the completion of the intended crime.54 This exten-
sion of the proximity rule has been referred to as the ‘last act’ test.55
For a number of reasons, the ‘last act’ test has failed to withstand the
test of time. The first is that Parke B did not explain whether the per-
formance of the last act dependent upon the accused toward the com-
mission of the offence is an absolute prerequisite to satisfying the actus
reus component of an attempt, or merely a sufficient condition prece-
dent thereto. If Parke B intended the former, then the test is laden with
the potential for untoward results in cases that, unlike Eagleton, do not
require action or inaction on the part of someone other than the accused
in order to consummate the subject offence. One such consequence is
that satisfaction of the ‘last act’ test would often result in the actual
commission of the complete offence, thereby obviating the need to
prosecute on the charge of attempt. Another potential untoward con-
sequence is that an accused who fails to perform the ‘last act’ due to
personal ineptitude or factual impossibility (discussed below) will totally
escape criminal liability for his or her conduct. If, for example, a person
purchases a firearm, loads it with ammunition, sneaks into someone’s
home and lies in wait with every intention of shooting them to death,
should that person escape liability for attempted murder solely because
the firearm jammed when he or she pulled the trigger? Finally, in cases
that involve a plan to consummate the subject offence in increments, as
by slowly poisoning someone to death, it would flout the very under-
pinnings of the law of inchoate offences if an accused were to escape
liability for attempted murder until the ultimate lethal dose has been
administered.
It is logical to assume, therefore, that Parke B intended the ‘last act’
test as a merely a sufficient condition precedent in establishing the actus
reus for an attempt, and only in cases such as Eagleton in which the action
or inaction of someone other than the accused is necessary to complete
52 (1855) Dears CC 376; 169 ER 776, 826.
53 Ibid. at 835.
54 Ibid. at 836.
55 See, e.g., above n. 34 at 685.
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the subject offence. Be that as it may, even in these instances the courts
and legislatures have resoundingly rejected the ‘last act’ test.56
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse,57 the appellant was a
British politician who took out several life insurance policies, faked his
death, and subsequently attempted to begin a new life in Australia
under an assumed name. At the time he was apprehended and extra-
dited to Britain, his wife had not submitted any claims on the life
insurance policies. The appellant appealed from his conviction for at-
tempting to obtain property by deception on the ground that, inter alia,
the appellant’s actions had not progressed far enough towards the
commission of the offence to fulfil the actus reus requirement of an
attempt.58
Counsel for the appellant accepted that the accused had made his
final contribution to the commission of the crime,59 but nonetheless
contended that he had not gone beyond the preparatory stage of the
offence.60 The case of R v Robinson61 was heavily relied upon in this
submission. In Robinson, the accused had staged an apparent burglary
and robbery of his store in order to collect on an insurance policy. It was
held by the court that as a fraudulent insurance claim had never been
communicated to the insurance company, the offence did not go beyond
the preparatory stage.62 The court in Robinson, therefore, founded its
judgment on the proximity rule of Parke B in Eagleton.63
The court in Stonehouse did not question the validity of Parke B’s test,
but did question whether it had been correctly applied in Robinson.64
After discussing the Eagleton test in more detail,65 the court went on to
examine the viability of the ‘last act’ test.66 Lord Edmund Davies, with
whom Lords Salmon and Keith concurred, rejected the proposition that
a person who performed the last act dependent on himself for commis-
sion of an offence should necessarily be guilty of an attempt, as their last
act could nonetheless fail to go beyond the preparatory stage.67 The
court held that in this particular case, the appellant's act of faking his
death was sufficiently proximate to the crime of obtaining property by
deception and, for that reason, upheld the conviction.68
Stonehouse was decided at a time when attempt was a common law
offence in the UK. Twelve years later in R v Jones,69 the English Court of
56 See, e.g., Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s. 321N(1); Criminal Code (NT) s. 4; Criminal
Code (Qld) s. 4; Criminal Code (WA) s. 4; see also Gillies, above n. 34 at 685;
B. Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law, 5th edn (Law Book Co: 1990) 393–4.
57 [1978] AC 55.
58 Ibid. at 64.
59 Ibid. at 84.
60 Ibid.
61 [1915] 2 KB 342.
62 Ibid. at 349.
63 Ibid. at 348.
64 [1978] AC 55 at 85.
65 Ibid. at 85–6.
66 Ibid. at 86.
67 Ibid.
68 For an example of more recent English authority denouncing the ‘last act’ test, see
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1992) [1993] 2 All ER 190.
69 (1990) 91 Cr App R 351.
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Appeal grappled with the proper construction to be accorded ss. 1(1)
and 4(3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which provide:
1. (1) If, with intent to commit a criminal offence . . . a person does an act
which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence,
he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence . . .
4. (3) Where, in a proceeding against a person for an offence under section
1 above, there is sufficient evidence in law to support a finding that he did
an act falling within subsection (1) of that section, the question whether or
not his act fell within that subsection is a question of fact.
The facts of Jones are very similar to the above example of the person
who, armed with a loaded firearm, sneaks into another’s home with the
intention of lying in wait and murdering the occupant, only to fail
because the gun unexpectedly jammed when the trigger was pulled. In
Jones, the appellant purchased a firearm, ammunition, and disguise and
then proceeded to sneak into the victim’s car with the intention of
shooting him to death. Fortunately for the victim, a struggle ensued and
the appellant was disarmed and arrested before he was able to remove
the safety catch and pull the trigger. The appellant was convicted of
attempted murder and appealed on the ground that the trial judge had
failed to direct the jury that s. 1(1) should be construed as a codification
of the ‘last act’ test enunciated in Eagleton.70 Specifically, the appellant
contended that three unperformed acts dependent upon the appellant
were necessary for the subject offence to be consummated:71 removing
the safety catch; placing his finger on the trigger; and pulling the trigger.
In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeal held that the require-
ments of s. 1(1) are satisfied when the preparatory phase ends and the
accused begins to embark upon the commission of the subject offence.72
The court stressed that the accused need not reach the point where it is
impossible to retreat from the commission of the subject offence in order
to satisfy the actus reus component of an attempt.73
(b) The ‘if not interrupted’ test
According to this test, the actus reus of an attempt is satisfied if an
accused’s act(s) or omission(s) form part of a series of acts (or omissions)
which, if not interrupted, would result in the commission of the subject
offence. This test has been expressly adopted by statute in Tasmania
(with qualifications) and has found support in a number of reported
decisions.74 This test is also fraught with problems, the most poignant
being that its adoption would have the effect of decriminalising attempts
that fall within the doctrine of ‘factual impossibility’ (discussed below),
70 (1990) 91 Cr App R 351 at 351.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. at 355.
73 Ibid.
74 Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s. 2(1), (3) and (4); R v Grogan (1889) 15 VLR 340 at
342; R v Page [1933] VLR 351 at 354; R v Borinelli [1962] SASR 214 at 218; R v
Collingridge (1976) 16 SASR 117 at 119ff, 139, 140; R v McPherson (1857) 169 ER
975; R v Collins (1864) 9 Cox CC 497 at 499; R v Linneker [1906] 2 KB 99; Davey v
Lee [1968] 1 QB 366 at 370.
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which has now been expressly repudiated as a defence in most jurisdic-
tions, including Tasmania.75 In the absence of some very innovative
statutory construction, it is difficult to understand how Tasmania can
expressly adopt the ‘if not interrupted’ test and, at the same time,
expressly reject the defence of factual impossibility. Although this issue
has yet to be authoritatively decided, two justices of the High Court have
construed the Tasmanian statute as abolishing the defence of factual
impossibility.76
(c) The unequivocal test
This test originated in the following passage from the judgment of Lord
Salmond in R v Barker:77
[A]n act done with intent to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt
unless it is of such a nature as to be itself sufficient evidence of the criminal
intent with which it is done. A criminal attempt is an act which shows
criminal intent on the face of it. The case must be one in which res ipsa
loquitur [the thing speaks for itself] applies . . . That a man’s unfulfilled
criminal purposes should be punishable, they must be manifested not by
his words merely, or by acts which are in themselves of innocent or
ambiguous significance, but by overt acts which are sufficient in them-
selves to declare and proclaim the guilty purpose with which they are
done.
This suggests that an accused’s act(s) or omission(s) will be insuffi-
cient to satisfy the actus reus of an attempt unless they are explicable only
on the basis that they manifest an intention to commit the subject
offence. Thus, there cannot be an attempt if there is a plausible explana-
tion of the relevant act(s) or omission(s) that is inconsistent with such
an intention. This test has thus far received scant support in Australia.78
Although the ‘unequivocal test’ is open to the criticism that it poses an
unreasonably high burden on the prosecution, the obvious counter
argument is that it is entirely appropriate in light of the prosecution’s
heavy burden of proof in criminal cases.
Unfortunately, there are other serious shortcomings that militate
strongly against the adoption of this test. Suppose, for example, that
there is uncontroverted evidence that after an accused procured a
firearm, ammunition, and a disguise, he then told several of his closest
friends that he planned to murder his spouse’s paramour at a time of his
choosing. It is arguable, if not probable, that the ‘equivocal test’ would
be satisfied under such circumstances. Yet there is little, if any, doubt
that these circumstances disclose a classical example of conduct that is
merely preparatory to and not immediately connected with the commis-
sion of the subject offence. The test, therefore, is laden with the potential
75 Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s. 2(2).
76 McGhee v R (1995) 130 ALR 142 at 160 (per Toohey and Gaudron JJ); see also
Haas v The Queen [1964] Tas R 1 at 28 (per Neasey J).
77 [1924] NZLR 865 at 874.
78 See R v Williams [1965] Qd 86 at 100 (per Stable J); O’Connor v Killian (1984) 38
SASR 327. But see Nicholson (1994) 76 A Crim R 187 at 190–2 (per Underwood J);
at 199 (per Wright J), a case in which the Tasmanian Court of Appeal refused to
adopt the test.
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for contravening the cardinal tenet that liability for an attempt cannot be
predicated on acts or omissions that do not progress beyond the prepara-
tion phase of a criminal scheme. Moreover, the test serves to further
cloud rather than clarify the troublesome distinction between conduct
that is immediately and not remotely connected with or merely prepara-
tory to the commission of the intended crime.
(d) The statutory test in Victoria
Section 321N(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:
A person is not guilty of attempting to commit an offence unless the
conduct of the person is—
(a) more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence;
and
(b) immediately and not remotely connected with the commission of
the offence.
In practical terms, this approach is similar, if not identical, to the
‘proximity’ limb of the test enunciated by Parke B in Eagleton, absent the
‘last act’ qualification. It is also very similar to the approaches adopted by
the House of Lords and the English Court of Appeal in Stonehouse and
Jones respectively. All of these tests share a common thread that acts or
omissions that amount to nothing more than preparation will not
suffice. They also have in common, however one chooses to express it,
that the act(s) or omission(s) of the accused must have progressed to the
point that the commission of the subject offence is imminent.
In the final analysis, there has never been, nor is there likely to be, a
formulation that can be applied with total fairness and consistency in
determining whether the actus reus for an attempt has been satisfied. The
tests set forth in Eagleton (minus the ‘last act’ qualification), Stonehouse,
Jones, and substantially codified in s. 321N(1) of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic), are probably the most satisfactory formulations of the actus reus of
an attempt to date. Though laden with uncertainty and the potential for
inconsistent results that create both the reality and perception of unfair-
ness, it can at least be said that they are not tainted with the obvious
flaws that inhere in the ‘last act’, ‘if not interrupted’, and ‘equivocal’
tests. This seemingly intractable difficulty in the law of attempts is
perhaps best summed up by a rather crass but effective comment of
Justice Potter Stewart in Jacobellis v Ohio.79 In a concurring opinion that
concerned the definition of obscenity for purposes of the First band
Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, Justice Stewart
wrote:80
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I under-
stand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it
. . .
79 378 US 184 (1964).
80 Ibid. at 197.
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5. The issue of voluntary desistance
What of the situation in which an accused is prima facie guilty of an
attempt, but voluntarily abandons his or her criminal scheme before the
subject offence is consummated? Will such voluntary desistance absolve
an accused of liability for an attempt? The answer is ‘no’ in both the UK
and the Australian jurisdictions that have considered the issue81. There
is some support for voluntary desistance as a defence in the USA.82 It is
clear, however, that voluntary desistance is not a defence in these
jurisdictions if the abandonment is prompted by outside forces such as
the sight of police officers, discovery that the intended crime is under
police surveillance, or similar factors.83 In other words, the abandon-
ment must be prompted by a bona fide change of heart rather than a
desire to avoid detection.84
The underlying rationale for the English and Australian position is a
desire to avoid the difficulties that will often arise in proving that the
desistance was not in fact prompted by a bona fide change of heart, but
by outside forces of such as fear of police presence or surveillance.85 The
English and Australian position assumes that this objective outweighs
whatever incentive for abandonment may be derived from allowing
voluntary desistance as a defence.86 Even if one disagrees with this
assessment of the relative costs and benefits of the English and Austra-
lian position, in the absence of mandatory sentencing provisions the
issue of voluntary desistance can and should be an important factor in
sentencing discretion.
6. Impossibility as a defence to attempts
The doctrine of ‘impossibility’ as a defence has been the subject of much
controversy and confusion over the years. Before proceeding to the
cases and statutes that presently govern this issue in Australia, it is
appropriate to explain the important distinction between ‘legal’ and
81 Criminal Code (NT) s. 4(2); R v Page [1933] VLR 351; Criminal Code (Qld) s. 4;
Criminal Code (Tas) s. 2(2); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s. 321N(3); Criminal Code
(WA) s. 4; R v Collingridge (1976) 16 SASR 117; R v Robinson [1915] 2 KB 342; see
also E. R. Meehan, The Law of Criminal Attempt, ch. 7 (BPR Publishing: 2000);
K. J. M. Smith, ‘Withdrawal from Criminal Liability for Complicity and Inchoate
Offences’ (1984) Anglo-American Law Review 200; P. R. Hoeber, ‘The Abandonment
Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other Problems of Temporal Individuation’
(1986) 74 California Law Review 377; M. Wasik, ‘Abandoning Criminal Intent’
[1980] Crim LR 785.
82 People v Von Hecht, 133 Cal App 2d 25 (1955); People v Walker, 33 Cal 2d 250, 259
(1948) (obiter dicta); People v Corkery, 134 Cal App 294, 297 (obiter dicta); People v
Kimball, 109 Mich App 273, 311 (1981).
83 People v Stites, 75 Cal 570 (1888); People v Davis, 70 Ill App 3d 454 (1979); People v
Lombard, 131 Cal App 525 (1933); State v Hansen, 290 Minn 552 (1971).
84 For a discussion of the American position on voluntary desistance as a defence to
attempts, see R. M. Perkins and R. N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Foundation
Press: 1982) 654–8.
85 R v Page [1933] VLR 351 at 353–4.
86 Ibid.
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‘factual’ impossibility. Under what is commonly referred to as the doc-
trine of ‘legal impossibility’, if an accused manages to accomplish every-
thing that he or she intended but, contrary to his or her belief at the
time, what is accomplished does not amount to a criminal offence, then
neither an attempt nor any other offence has been committed. In
principle, it is difficult to find fault with this doctrine. If one’s ultimate
objective is not a criminal offence, this fact cannot be altered by an
accused’s mistaken belief that his or her objective was in contravention
of the criminal law.
The doctrine of legal impossibility arises in two scenarios. The first is
where an accused mistakenly believes that his or her ultimate objective
is in fact criminal. This occurs, for example, when a person smuggles a
substance into Australia in the mistaken belief that its importation and
possession are criminal offences. The second is where a person is not
within the class of persons who, by law, are capable of committing the
subject offence. An example would be a person who commits what
would otherwise be a crime, but is below the age of capacity to incur
criminal liability.87 The same is true of statutory offences that evince a
clear legislative intent to exclude a particular class of persons from
liability for an attempt to commit the subject offence. As explained by
Professor Brent Fisse in Howard’s Criminal Law:88
A statutory illustration is s 33A of the Crimes Act (N.S.W.) which provides
that it is an offence to discharge or attempt to discharge any kind of loaded
firearm with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. It would not amount to
an attempt under this section to endeavour to fire a rifle with an intent to
inflict grievous bodily harm if, contrary to D’s belief, the rifle was not in fact
loaded. The wording of the provision, coupled with the severe maximum
jail penalty (14 years), evince a legislative intention to confine liability for
attempt to the extreme danger arising from the intentional misuse of loaded
firearms . . .
Although it is often said that legal impossibility is a complete defence to
a charge of attempt, this is actually a misnomer. Simply stated, if no
crime has been committed, then there is no need to interpose this or any
other defence.
The doctrine of ‘factual’ impossibility, on the other hand, has proved
to be more problematic over the years.89 The scenario envisaged by this
doctrine is that the accused’s intended objective would have amounted
to a crime on the facts as he or she believed them to be, but he or she failed
to consummate the crime due to the existence of facts unbeknownst to
him or her which made its completion impossible. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that an accused enters the bedroom of an intended victim with the
intention of shooting him to death. Assume further that the accused
then fires several live rounds into a pile of laundry, mistakenly believing
the pile to be the intended victim. Or, suppose that an accused intends to
poison the victim by placing a lethal dose of cyanide in his or her drink.
87 Willis (1864) 4 SCR (NSW) (L) 59.
88 5th edn (Law Book Co: 1990) at 409.
89 D. O’Connor and P. A. Fairall, Criminal Defences, 3rd edn (LexisNexis Butterworths:
1996) 117.
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Fortunately for the intended victim, the accused mistakenly places a
harmless substance in the drink. These are classical examples of ‘factual’
as distinguished from ‘legal’ impossibility. In both instances the accused
has acted with the requisite mens rea for attempted murder. Moreover,
under any formulation other than the ‘if not interrupted’ test, the
accused’s conduct has progressed far enough towards the commission of
the subject offence to satisfy the actus reus for attempted murder. Is
‘factual’ impossibility a defence to a charge of attempted murder under
these fact patterns?
In Haughton v Smith,90 the House of Lords held that ‘factual’ im-
possibility is a defence to what would otherwise have been an attempt.
The decision came under severe criticism,91 and rightly so. If an accused
has satisfied both the mens rea and actus reus components of an attempt,
is there any reason he or she should be absolved of liability solely on the
basis of ‘factual impossibility’? If one accepts that the three paramount
objectives of the criminal law are deterrence, retribution, and rehabilita-
tion, are any of these interests served by drawing a distinction between
one who fails to consummate a crime due to factual impossibility and
one who fails due to other factors such as personal ineptitude? Is the
person who fires several live rounds at a pile of laundry in the mistaken
belief that it is his or her intended victim any less culpable than the
person who, with murderous intent, fires several live rounds at the
intended victim and misses due to poor marksmanship?
The criticism of Haughton v Smith culminated in the Criminal At-
tempts Act 1981 (UK) that appeared to abolish the defence of factual
impossibility. In Anderton v Ryan,92 however, the House of Lords con-
strued the new legislation as sanctioning factual impossibility as a de-
fence to attempt. The House of Lords subsequently revisited this issue in
R v Shivpuri.93
In Shivpuri, the House of Lords dealt with an accused that was in
possession of a substance which he believed to be heroin, but which in
fact was a legal vegetable material.94 The accused was charged with
attempting to distribute heroin. The question presented on appeal was
whether factual impossibility constituted a defence to the crime of
attempt.95
In dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords had no difficulty in
finding that the accused intended to smuggle heroin96 and that his
conduct in furtherance of that objective had gone beyond the prepara-
tion phase of the intended crime.97 The court opined that in determining
whether the actus reus was satisfied, it should evaluate the degree of
proximity between the accused’s acts and the intended crime. The court
further opined that to evaluate acts according to their proximity to the
90 [1975] AC 476.
91 Glanville Williams, ‘The Lords and Impossible Attempts’ [1986] CLJ 33.
92 [1985] AC 560.
93 [1987] AC 1.
94 Ibid. at 2.
95 Ibid. at 4.
96 Ibid. at 19.
97 Ibid.
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intended crime would, in effect, allow factual impossibility to be a
perfect defence because it is impossible for an act to be proximate to an
event that cannot occur.98 Ultimately, the court reasoned that to accord
this status to factual impossibility would create an irreconcilable conflict
between ss. 1(1) and (2) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (UK).
The House of Lords went on99 to analyse Anderton v Ryan,100 a case in
which the accused was charged with and later acquitted of attempted
theft; specifically, the accused had purchased goods that he falsely
believed to be stolen.101 In reaching its decision, the court drew a
distinction between ‘objectively innocent’ and ‘objectively guilty’
acts.102 An act is 'objectively innocent' when ‘the mind alone is
guilty’,103 as where a person tries to steal an item in the mistaken belief
that he or she is not the owner. ‘Subjectively’ the person is stealing, but
‘objectively’ the person is merely taking his or her own property.
Upon analysis of Ryan, the House of Lords found this distinction
unworkable.104 The court reasoned that all acts which fall short of
committing a crime are regarded in law as ‘objectively’ innocent.105 The
court then considered whether Ryan might be distinguished on account
of the ‘dominant intention’ of the defendant.106 The court also found
this ground of distinction unworkable, not only because of the difficulty
in defining 'dominant intention' to a jury,107 but also because of the
theoretical hurdles it encountered in attempting to categorise the mens
rea of intent into lesser and greater parts.108 Accordingly, the court
overruled Ryan, stating that it was a ‘wrong’ decision.109 In light of
Shivpuri, it is clear that factual impossibility in any form is not defence to
the crime of attempt; this is also the current position in most Australian
jurisdictions.110
In the Northern Territory and Queensland, the rejection of factual
impossibility as a defence is subject to the qualification that the accused’s
intention to commit the intended offence must be put into execution ‘by
means adapted to its fulfilment . . .’.111 Though the foregoing qualifica-
tion is stated as an actus reus requirement of an attempt, its practical effect
is to allow factual impossibility to be raised as a defence whenever the
circumstances were such that it was impossible for the accused to
consummate the subject offence because the means used were not
98 [1987] AC 1 at 20.
99 Ibid.
100 [1985] AC 560
101 Ibid. at 560.
102 Ibid. at 584.
103 Ibid. at 583.
104 [1987] AC 1 at 21.




109 Ibid. at 23.
110 Criminal Code (Qld) s. 4(3), Criminal Code (WA) s. 4; Criminal Code (Tas) s.
2(2)); Criminal Code (NT) s 4(2); R v Mai and Tran (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; Britten
v Alpogut [1987] VR 929 at 935–36, 938; R v Cogley [1989] VR 799; R v Lee (1990)
1 WAR 411 (CCA WA) at 423, 433.
111 Criminal Code (NT) s. 4(1); Criminal Code (Qld) s. 4(1).
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adapted to the fulfilment of his or her criminal objective. Thus, the
above-quoted statutory expression appears to denote means which,
under normal circumstances, would be sufficient to consummate the
intended crime. Curiously, the statutory offences of attempt in Queens-
land and the Northern Territory are conspicuously silent on the question
of how far an accused must progress towards the commission of the
subject offence in order to incur liability for an attempt: Criminal Code
(NT) s. 4; Criminal Code (Qld) s. 4. Nonetheless, at least one appellate
court judgment has construed these provisions as adopting the common
law position that the conduct in question must be immediately and not
merely remotely connected with the commission of the subject of-
fence.112 Though not expressed in the judgment of Mildren J, this
construction was likely based on the precept that even in Code jurisdic-
tions the common law is highly persuasive in resolving statutory ambi-
guities.113 The natural wording of s. 4, however, does not lend itself to
such an interpretation. Assuming that the Northern Territory and
Queensland legislatures intended to limit liability for attempt to conduct
that is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the subject
offence, the statutes in question should be amended to incorporate one
of the various ‘proximity’ tests noted above.
The reason for allowing what amounts to a very limited defence of
factual impossibility is that there are arguably situations in which it
would be patently absurd to initiate a prosecution for attempt, notwith-
standing that an accused has acted with the requisite mens rea and
progressed beyond the preparatory phase of committing the subject
offence.114 A classical example of this would be where D places a voodoo
curse on V, fully intending and believing that the curse will result in V’s
imminent death. As the means (the curse) are clearly not adapted to
fulfilling D’s intention to kill, D could not be successfully prosecuted for
attempted murder. While there is a certain appeal in allowing a limited
defence of factual impossibility under such circumstances, it is important
to keep in mind that attempt, like the other inchoate offences, is
designed to allow law enforcement to pre-emptively strike out against
persons who, despite possessing the requisite mens rea for an intended
crime, have yet to fully express it in their conduct. But if that is so, is it
not reasonable to assume that one who fails to consummate an offence
because of insufficient means will later commit, or at least attempt to
commit, the same offence through means that are adapted to fulfilling
the criminal objective? It is the view of this author that the better
approach is to abrogate the defence of factual impossibility in its entirety
and leave the decision of whether to prosecute cases of this type within
the discretion of the executive branch of the government.
Another limited version of the factual impossibility defence has been
recognised in South Australian cases such as R v Collingridge115 and R v
112 Prior v R (1992) 91 NTR 53 at 58 (per Mildren J).
113 Brennan v R (1936) 55 CLR 253 at 263; Stuart v R (1974) 134 CLR 426 at 437.
114 J. McR. Herlihy, ‘Attempts and Impossibility under the Queensland Criminal Code’
(1980) 11 University of Queensland Law Journal 160 at 163.
115 (1976) 16 SASR 117 at 122, 124.
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Kristo.116 These decisions held that factual impossibility can be a defence
to a charge of attempt, but only when the circumstances were such that
it was absolutely impossible to consummate the subject offence, regard-
less of the means adopted.117 According to these decisions, absolute
impossibility does not include instances in which the commission of the
subject offence is frustrated by human intervention such as an accused’s
personal ineptitude, lack of sufficient means to accomplish the intended
crime, voluntary desistance, or the intervention of a police officer or
other interested party.118 This version of a limited defence of factual
impossibility is also fraught with difficulty. Aside from the fact that the
distinction between absolute impossibility and instances in which the
commission of an intended offence is frustrated through human inter-
vention is difficult to reconcile with the underlying rationale for incho-
ate offences, in many instances this distinction is simply unworkable.
For example, suppose that D, intending to murder V, fires several live
rounds into a large object located under a blanket on V’s bed. Un-
beknown to D, V has gone to use the bathroom and the large object
turns out to be nothing more than a pile of dirty laundry. Is this a case of
absolute impossibility, or one in which the commission of the intended
crime was frustrated through human intervention, in this case the
human intervention of V in leaving the room just moments before the
shots were fired?119
7. Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, the law of attempt has
been riddled with seemingly insurmountable problems that consider-
able judicial and legislative efforts have, regrettably, failed to abate. The
purpose of this article is not to provide a panacea for all of these
contentious issues; rather, it is to analyse them from a new perspective
that will facilitate a better understanding of their pitfalls and re-energise
the type of academic discourse that will provide the impetus for much
needed reform in this troubled area of the law. To be sure, the lesson of
decades past is that just reform will only be possible if the courts and
legislatures are prepared to look at these old problems from a different
vantage point.
116 (1989) 39 A Crim R 86 at 93ff, 111.
117 (1976) 16 SASR 117 at 124; (1989) 39 A Crim R 86 at 104.
118 (1976) 16 SASR 117 at 122; (1989) 39 A Crim R 86 at 103.
119 For an insightful critique of the limited defence of factual impossibility in South
Australia, see B. Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law, 5th edn (1990) 401–12.
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